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Abstract
This paper outlines key design principles of Scilla—an intermediate-
level language for verified smart contracts.
Scilla provides a clean separation between the communication
aspect of smart contracts on a blockchain, allowing for the rich
interaction patterns, and a programming component, which enjoys
principled semantics and is amenable to formal verification. Scilla
is not meant to be a high-level programming language, and we
are going to use it as a translation target for high-level languages,
such as Solidity, for performing program analysis and verification,
before further compilation to an executable bytecode.
We describe the automata-based model of Scilla, present its
programming component and show how contract definitions in
terms of automata streamline the process of mechanised verification
of their safety and temporal properties.
1 Introduction
Smart contracts are a mechanism for expressing computations on a
blockchain, i.e., a decentralised Byzantine-fault-tolerant distributed
ledger. In addition to typical state of computations, a blockchain
stores a mapping from accounts (public keys or addresses) to quan-
tities of tokens owned by said accounts. Execution of an arbitrary
program aka a smart contract is done by miners, who run the com-
putations and maintain the distributed ledger in exchange for a
combination of gas (transaction fees based on the execution length,
denominated in the intrinsic tokens and paid by the account calling
the smart contract) and block rewards (inflationary issuance of fresh
tokens by the underlying protocol). One distinguishing property of
smart contracts, not found in standard computational settings is
the transfer of tokens between accounts.
One of the challenges of writing smart contracts is that the
implemented operational semantics of smart contract languages
admit rather subtle behaviour that diverge from the “intuitive un-
derstanding” of the language in the minds of contract developers.
Some of the largest attacks on smart contracts, e.g., the attack on
the DAO [29] and Parity wallet [17] contracts, have turned on
such divergencies.1 Software development techniques that have
proven very effective in other domains such as app development
(e.g., “move fast and break things” [4]) have not translated success-
fully to smart contract development because it is nearly impossible
to patch a contract once deployed due to the anonymous Byzantine
execution environment of a public blockchain [29]. Moreover, soft-
ware engineering techniques, such as static and dynamic analysis
tools such as Manticore [6], Mythril [8], Oyente [9], Solgraph [13]
have not yet proven to be effective in increasing the reliability of
smart contracts.
1By sending money to a user-chosen address, the DAO actually called user-chosen
code, which in turn executed an unexpected callback into the original contract, which
was in a “dirty” state [48].
Formal methods, such as verification and model checking, are
an attractive alternative for increasing the reliability of smart con-
tracts [12, 20, 33]. Formal methods can provide precise definitions
for operational behaviour, and therefore can illuminate and hope-
fully reduce subtle behaviour. Generally speaking, formal methods
can produce more rigorous guarantees about program behaviour:
mathematical proofs instead of summaries of accumulated ad-hoc
experience. Moreover, formal methods can provide static guaran-
tees, guaranteeing safety and liveness properties before contracts
are irrevocably committed to the blockchain.
In order to apply formal methods efficiently in such a new setting
to reason about smart contracts and enable efficient language-based
verification [51], one must weigh several factors:
• Expressivity. There is a trade-off between making a language
simpler to understand and making it more expressive. Bitcoin
script [3] occupies the “simpler” end of the spectrum: contracts ba-
sically specify validity conditions (simple expressions) that must
hold before coins can be transferred. Ethereum [54] occupies
the “expressive” end of the spectrum, with a Turing-complete in-
struction set. However, expressivity is not free. Turing-complete
languages are more complex to reason about, especially in an
automated manner. Moreover, infinite computations are neither
possible nor desirable on a blockchain due to the use of gas to
compensate miners (an infinite loop will happily consume as
much gas as one cares to feed it even if no progress is being
made). It is as yet unclear if the expressivity of a fully Turing-
complete instruction set is necessary to support a practical smart
contract ecosystem.
• State. Fundamentally, the blockchain is a stateful database due
to the necessity of maintaining and securely updating the map-
ping between accounts and tokens owned. Moreover, the “event-
driven” style of programming employed by many smart contracts
(which tend to wait for messages, act on them, and then return
to waiting for the next message) requires the storage of contract
state between calls. A contract implementing an Initial Coin Of-
fering (ICO) campaign, which records each contributor and the
size of their contributions is a standard example of such a stateful
event-driven contract. On the other hand, purely functional lan-
guages are less error-prone, harder to attack, easier to parallelise,
and easier to reason about, so there are good reasons to consider
approaches that use mutable state sparingly.
• Communication. Contracts are often used to allow multiple
mutually-distrusting parties to interact. This interaction can oc-
cur in several ways: by one contract calling another, by rais-
ing an event (to be seen and handled off-chain), or by off-chain
computations calling back into the blockchain in later blocks.
Communication is highly desirable, but can introduce both gen-
uine and faux-concurrent behaviour, especially in a Byzantine
environment, enabling attacks due to potentially corrupted state.
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• Meaning of execution. Operational semantics should be clear
and principled, minimising the chance of informalmisunderstand-
ing. Moreover, there should be support for machine-checked for-
mal reasoning, ideally both automatically-generated (for simpler
properties) and human-assisted (for more complex ones).
In this work, we present Scilla: a novel intermediate-level program-
ming language for smart contracts. By “intermediate” we mean that
we do not expect most programmers to write in Scilla directly,
any more than most programmers write in x86 assembly directly.
Instead, the typical path will be to compile a higher-level language
to Scilla and then further to an executable bytecode, very much
in a tradition of optimizing [35] and verified compilers [37]. Scilla
aims to achieve both expressivity and tractability, while enabling
rigorous formal reasoning about contract behavior, by adopting the
following fundamental design principles, based on separation of
programming concerns:
Separation between computation and communication. Con-
tracts in Scilla are structured as communicating automata: every
in-contract computation (e.g., changing its balance or computing a
value of a function) is implemented as a standalone, atomic tran-
sition, i.e., without involving any other parties. Whenever such
involvement is required (e.g., for transferring control to another
party), a transition would end, with an explicit communication,
by means of sending and receiving messages. The automata-based
structure makes it possible to disentangle the contract-specific ef-
fects (i.e., transitions) from blockchain-wide interactions (i.e., send-
ing/receiving funds andmessages), thus providing a clean reasoning
mechanism about contract composition and invariants.
Separation between effectful and pure computations. Any in-
contract computation happening within a transition has to termi-
nate, and have a predictable effect on the state of the contract and
the execution. In order to achieve this, we draw inspiration from
functional programming with effects, drawing a distinction between
pure expressions (e.g., expressions with primitive data types and
maps), impure local state manipulations (i.e., reading/writing into
contract fields) and blockchain reflection (e.g., reading current block
number). By carefully designing semantics of interaction between
pure and impure language aspects, we ensure a number of founda-
tional properties about contract transitions, such as progress and
type preservation, while also making them amenable to interactive
and/or automatic verification with standalone tools.
Separation between invocation and continuation. Structuring
contracts as communicating automata provides a computational
model, known as continuation-passing style (CPS), in which every
call to an external function (i.e., another contract) can be done as the
absolutely last instruction. While this programming style is helpful
for avoiding multiple pitfalls stemming from interaction between
separate contracts (e.g., uncontrolled reentrancy [29]), it might be
difficult to program with or use as an intermediate representation.
To regain the expressivity, while retaining the principled structure
of an automata, we add a special kind of transitions—continuations—
that are invoked by the execution environment. Thanks to themech-
anism of explicit continuations [47], we can provide a straightfor-
ward translation from languages like Solidity to Scilla, yet, keeping
the automata structure as a foundational model for analysis and
verification.
Paper outline
In the rest of this manuscript, we will describe main components of
Scilla. In Section 2 we present its computational model, based on
communicating automata. In Section 3 we demonstrate the support
for reasoning about properties of contract executions, enabled by
the automata model. Future design choiceswrt. contract verification
are discussed in Section 4. We provide a survey of related contract
language design proposals in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Contracts as Communicating Automata
In this section, we explain the key concept of Scilla language
design using a characteristic example—a crowdfunding campaign
à la Kickstarter.2 In a crowdfunding campaign, a project owner
wishes to raise funds through donations from the community. In
the specific example modelled here, we assume that the owner
wishes to run the campaign for a certain pre-determined period
of time. The owner also wishes to raise a minimum amount of
funds without which the project can not be started. The campaign
is deemed successful if the owner can raise the minimum goal. In
case the campaign is unsuccessful, the donations are returned to
the project backers who contributed during the campaign.
An implementation of the contract in Scilla is given in Figure 1.
The design of the Crowdfunding contract is intentionally simplistic
(for example, it does not allow the backers to change the amount
of their donation), yet it shows the important features of Scilla,
which we elaborate upon.
The contract is parameterised with three values that will remain
immutable during its lifetime (lines 2–4): an owner account address
owner of type address, a maximal block number max_block (of type
uint), indicating a deadline, after which no more donations will be
accepted from backers, and a goal (also of type uint) indicating the
amount of funds the owner plans to raise. The goal is not a hard
cap but rather the minimum amount that the owner wishes to raise.
What follows is the block of mutable field declarations (lines 7–
10). The mutable fields of the contract are the mapping backers
(of type address⇒ uint), which will be used to keep track of the
incoming donations and is initialised with an empty map literal [],
and a mutable boolean flag funded that indicates whether the owner
has already transferred the funds after the end of the campaign
(initialised with false). In addition to these fields, any contract in
Scilla has an implicitly declared mutable field balance (initialised
upon the contract’s creation), which keeps the amount of funds
held by the contract. This field can be freely read within the imple-
mentation, as we will demonstrate below, but can only modified by
explicitly transferring funds to other accounts.
2.1 Transitions and messages
The logic of the contract is implemented by three transitions: Donate,
GetFunds, and Claim. The first one serves for donating funds to a
campaign by external backers; the second allows the owner to
transfer the funds to its account once the campaign is ended and
the goal is reached; the final one makes it possible for the backers
to reclaim their funds in the case the campaign was not successful.
One can think of transitions as methods or functions in Solidity
contracts. What makes them different from functions, though, is
the atomicity of the computation enforced at the language level.
Specifically, each transition manipulates only with the state of the
2https://www.kickstarter.com
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1 contract Crowdfunding
2 (owner : address,
3 max_block : uint,
4 goal : uint)
5
6 (* Mutable state description *)
7 {
8 backers : address⇒ uint = [];
9 funded : boolean = false;
10 }
11
12 (* Transition 1: Donating money *)
13 transition Donate
14 (sender : address, value : uint, tag : string)
15 (* Simple filter identifying this transition *)
16 if tag == "donate"⇒
17 bs← & backers;
18 blk← && block_number;
19 let nxt_block = blk + 1 in
20 if max_block ≤ nxt_block
21 then send (<to→ sender, amount→ 0,
22 tag→ "main",
23 msg→ "deadline_passed">, MT)
24 else
25 if not (contains(bs, sender))
26 then let bs1 = put(bs, sender, value) in
27 backers := bs1;
28 send (<to→ sender,
29 amount→ 0,
30 tag→ "main",
31 msg→ "ok">, MT)
32 else send (<to→ sender,
33 amount→ 0,
34 tag→ "main",
35 msg→ "already_donated">, MT)
36 (* Transition 2: Sending the funds to the owner *)
37 transition GetFunds
38 (sender : address, value : uint, tag : string)
39 (* Only the owner can get the money back *)
40 if (tag == "getfunds") && (sender == owner)⇒
41 blk← && block_number;
42 bal← & balance;
43 if max_block < blk
44 then if goal ≤ bal
45 then funded := true;
46 send (<to→ owner, amount→ bal,
47 tag→ "main", msg→ "funded">, MT)
48 else send (<to→ owner, amount→ 0,
49 tag→ "main", msg→ "failed">, MT)
50 else send (<to→ owner, amount→ 0, tag→ "main",
51 msg→ "too_early_to_claim_funds">, MT)
52
53 (* Transition 3: Reclaim funds by a backer *)
54 transition Claim
55 (sender : address, value : uint, tag : string)
56 if tag == "claim"⇒
57 blk← && block_number;
58 if blk ≤ max_block
59 then send (<to→ sender, amount→ 0, tag→ "main",
60 msg→ "too_early_to_reclaim">, MT)
61 else bs← & backers;
62 bal← & balance;
63 if (not (contains(bs, sender))) || funded ||
64 goal ≤ bal
65 then send (<to→ sender, amount→ 0,
66 tag→ "main",
67 msg→ "cannot_refund">, MT)
68 else
69 let v = get(bs, sender) in
70 backers := remove(bs, sender);
71 send (<to→ sender, amount→ v, tag→ "main",
72 msg→ "here_is_your_money">, MT)
Figure 1. Crowdfunding contract in Scilla: state and transitions.
contract itself, without involving any other contracts or parties. All
interaction with the external world, with respect to the contract,
happens either at the very start of a transition, when it is initiated by
an external message, or at the end, when a message (or messages),
possibly carrying some amount of funds, can be emitted and sent
to other parties.
Each transition can be invoked by a suitable message, which
should provide a corresponding tag as its component to identify
which transition is triggered. It is enforced at the compile time that
tags define transitions unambiguously. All other components of the
message, relevant for the transition to be executed, are declared
as the transition’s parameters. For instance, the transition Donate
expects the incoming message to have at least the fields sender,
value, and tag. What follows in each transition’s definition is the
filter—an optional clause if e ⇒, where e is a boolean-returning
computation that can involve reading from the components of the
incoming message and the contract’s state, deciding whether the
corresponding transition can be taken. For instance, the transitions
Donate and Claim only check that the tag of a message matches that
of the transition; the filter of GetFunds (line 40) additionally checks
that the sender of the message is the contract’s owner.
To keep the logic of filters simple, we deliberately disallow com-
plex expressions in them, as well as write-interaction with the
contract’s state. Any further checks relating to the incoming mes-
sage with the contract’s state can be implemented in a transition’s
body, as we describe further.
2.2 Basics of program flow
Every transition in a contract can be roughly thought of as a func-
tion that maps an incoming message and an initial contract state
to a new contract state and a set of outgoing messages. Ignoring
the state-manipulation aspect for a moment, let us consider the
functional component of Scilla.
As implementations of transitions in Figure 1 demonstrate, the
language syntax includes binding of pure expressions (such as arith-
metic and boolean operations, as well as manipulation with map-
pings) via OCaml-style let-in construct (e.g., lines 19 and 69). Ba-
sic control flow also includes branching if-then-else statements,
whose semantics is standard. At the moment, we keep an agnos-
tic view wrt. the pure component of the language, which will be
fixed later and can be as expressive as a polymorphic lambda-
calculus [31, 46]. Furthermore, looping constructs are not present
in our working example, but we are planning to support them via
well-founded recursive function definitions, so their termination
can be proved statically.
Every transition’s last command, in each of the execution branches,
is either sending a set of messages, or simply returning. Messages
are encoded as vectors <...> of name→ value entries, including at
least the destination address (to), an amount of funds transferred
(amount) and a default tag of the function to be invoked (tag). All
transitions of the Crowdfunding end by sending a message to either
the sender of the initial request or the contract’s owner. For exam-
ple, depending on the state of the contract and the blockchain, the
transition GetFund might end up in either sending a message with
its balance to the contract’s owner, if the campaign has succeeded
and the deadline has passed, or zero funds with a corresponding
text otherwise.
In addition to a message, the trailing send command of a tran-
sition includes a continuation value to indicate possible further
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execution in a return-flow. The Crowdfunding contract does not re-
quire any such executions, so all continuations are “empty” (i.e.,
they do not initiate any further execution after the callee contract
returns), which is indicated by the literal MT. We will provide ex-
amples of contracts involving non-trivial return-flow (and, hence,
featuring interesting continuations) in Section 2.4.
2.3 State and effects
In addition to performing computations with the components of the
incoming messages and parameters of the contract, every transition
can manipulate with the state of a contract itself, i.e., read/write
from/to its mutable fields, as well as read from the blockchain.
The state of the contract, represented by its fields, is mutable: it
can be changed by the contract’s transitions. A body of a transition
can read from the fields, assigning the result to immutable stack
variables using the specialised syntax x ←& f;, where f is a field
name and x is a fresh name of a local variable (e.g., lines 17 and 42).
In a similar vein, a body of transition can store a result of a pure
expression e into a contract field f using the syntax f := e; (as in
lines 27 and 70). The dichotomy between pure expressions (coming
with corresponding binding form let-in) and impure (“effectful”)
commands manipulating the field values, is introduced on purpose
to facilitate logic-based verification of contracts, reasoning about
the effect of a transition to the contract’s state, while abstracting
away from evaluation of pure expressions, similarly to how it is
done in functional languages, such as Haskell.
In addition to reading/writing contract state, each transition
implementation can use read-only introspection on the current state
of the blockchain using the “deep read” operation x ←&& g;, where
g is a name of the corresponding aspect of the underlying blockchain
state. For example, the Crowdfunding contract reads the number of
a current block in lines 18 and 41. A syntactic emphasis on the
contract’s interaction with the blockchain’s current state makes
it possible to enable reasoning about contract liveness properties,
spanning its long-term behavior, as we will show in Section 3.
At the moment, the model of Scilla does not feature explicit
exceptions, as those are going to be implemented at the level of
runtime, without a possibility of raising in the code.3
2.4 Advanced control flow and continuations
It is not uncommon for a contract to call another contract, for in-
stance, implementing a library, and then use the result of the call in
the rest of the execution. Currently, the main model of computation
in Scilla prevents this, as it corresponds to a tail-call program form:
passing control to another contract can be done only by explicitly
sending it a message, not via a call within the transition. Existing
high-level languages for contracts, such as Solidity, allow non-tail
calls from the middle of a contract execution, and require the no-
tion of program stack in order to handle the returned result. The
presence of non-tail calls in Solidity is what enabled the infamous
DAO exploit [29], which was due to the fact that the rest of a con-
tract computation, setting the fields accounting for the balance of a
contributor, was performed only upon returning from a call to an-
other contract, not before. This led to tail-call programming being
advocated as a “good programming practice” for smart contracts
written in Solidity-like languages [24].
3This design choice might change in the future, in favor of implementing exceptions
as another computational effect.
While the core language of Scilla enforces non-tail calls from
contract transitions, we acknowledge the need for them in certain
applications, and introduce an additional component to the execu-
tion: explicit continuations. Continuations can be thought of as “the
rest of computation”, to be invoked after execution of a call to an
external function, being passed the result of the latter. One can also
encode exception handling via continuations, which, in that case,
would play the role of catch-clauses.
Functional programming languages, such as Haskell and OCaml
allow for encoding continuations as closures (first-class anonymous
functions), thus implementing a style of programming, known as
Continuation-Passing Style (CPS) [19]. In programming languages
without first-class functions, such as Solidity, continuations still can
be encoded via a dedicated data type that “enumerates” all possible
shapes of “remaining computations” and a helper function that
gives them an operational meaning, i.e., “executes” the continuation.
A transformation of a program from a non-tail-call form to CPS
to a form with continuations encoded as a data type (known as a
defunctionalisation [28, 47]) is a well-studied topic in the research
area of compiler implementation [27], and we adopt it in the design
of Scilla.
Specifically, in Figure 1, every tail call made via send also takes
a second argument, continuation MT. This is a constant, “empty”,
continuation (hence the name), which indicates that no remain-
ing computation should take place after the execution of a callee
contract. However, instead of empty continuation, we could have
specified, for instance, a continuation that expects a callee contract
result to return a result of type uint, and sends it back in a message
to the owner of a caller contract:
(* Specifying a continuation in a Caller contract *)
continuation UseResult (res : uint)
send (<to → owner, amount → 0,
tag → "main", msg → res>, MT)
(* Using a continuation in a transition of Caller *)
transition ClientTransition
(sender : address, value : uint, tag : string)
(* code of the transition *)
send (<to → sender, amount → 0,
tag → "main", msg → res>, UseResult)
(* Returning a result in a callee contract *)
transition ServerTransition
(sender : address, value : uint, tag : string)
(* code of the transition *)
return value
That is, in a Scilla contract, a continuation is very similar to a
transition, except it takes not a message, but a value, which is, in its
turn, returned by a callee contract using a return command, which
is an alternative to send and does not send a message. The unifor-
mity of contract-specified continuations and transitions makes it
possible to reason about them in the same way as about transitions,
in the style demonstrated further in Section 3.
What makes continuations different from transitions is that they
are “passive”, i.e., their invocation is handled by the semantics of the
execution environment, which maintains them in a stack, invoking
the topmost continuation after the current contract executes a
transition until the return statement. In contrast, transitions are
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“active”, i.e., they should be explicitly invoked, externally or by other
contracts, by sending a message.
Notice that a continuation can itself “schedule” another contin-
uation for later execution as a rest of computation. For instance,
in the code snippet above the UseResult continuation ends with
sending a message and scheduling an MT continuation. In princi-
ple, a continuation can even schedule itself, which would mean
a potentially non-terminating execution. That is, the only non-
well-founded recursion in Scilla can be implemented via contracts
calling themselves or other contracts in a circular way. Such poten-
tially non-terminating computations involving multiple transitions
and continuations are going to be handled using the gas mech-
anism, similar to the one implemented in Ethereum. In contrast,
standalone transitions of a contract always terminate.
In the future, we are going to implement an automatic translator
from a subset of Solidity into Scilla by employing CPS transforma-
tion and defunctionalisation, in order to produce Scilla contracts
formulated in terms of transitions for direct control flow and con-
tinuations for return-flow.
3 Mechanised Verification of Scilla Contracts
We now turn our attention to formally reasoning about executable
contracts implemented in Scilla. The language’s automata-based
model allows us to state a formal semantics of a contract’s execu-
tions, both independent and parameterised via interaction scenarios
with other contracts, as well as to rigorously capture the properties
of a contract’s executions during its life-cycle. Below, we show
how to reason both about safety (nothing goes wrong) and liveness
(certain things may eventually happen) properties.
We are developing Scilla hand-in-hand with the formalisation
of its semantics and its embedding into the Coq proof assistant [25]—
a state-of-the art tool for mechanised proofs about programs, based
on advanced dependently-typed theory and featuring a large set
of mathematical libraries.4 In the past, Coq has been successfully
applied for implementing certified (i.e., fully mechanically veri-
fied) compilers [37], operational systems [32], concurrent [49] and
distributed applications [38], including blockchains [44].
Further in this section, we will show the translation from Scilla
to Coq (which is mostly straightforward), as well as the definition of
contract protocols, semantics and safety/liveness properties, along
with the corresponding proof machinery. We will then present and
discuss a series of properties of the Crowdfunding contract from
Section 2 that we have verified. In this manuscript, we outline
a preliminary simplified model of contracts, which does not fea-
ture resource semantics (i.e., Ethereum-style “gas”), full-fledged
blockchain reflection, and advanced control-flow features, such as
continuations and exceptions. All these aspects are orthogonal to
the automata-based model we are describing; that can and will be
modelled in the future in our framework for formal verification, by
enhancing the Coq model of the Scilla contracts and its semantics.
3.1 Contracts in Coq: basic definitions and properties
We present a simplified version of Scilla’s semantics in Coq. Coq’s
programming component, Gallina, is an ML-family language [40]
with a similar syntax, featuring first-class functions, algebraic data
types, and records. All data types are immutable, and so are function
4The mechanised embedding of a subset of Scilla into Coq is publicly available for
downloads and experiments: https://github.com/ilyasergey/scilla-coq.
Structure message :=
Msg { val : value;
sender : address;
method : tag;
body : payload }.
Structure cstate (S : Type) :=
CState { my_id : address;
balance : value; state : S }.
Structure bstate :=
BState { block_num : nat;
(* More components of the blockchain. *) }.
Structure transition :=
CTrans { ttag : tag;
tfun : address → value → S → message →
bstate → (S * option message); }.
Structure Contract (S : Type) := Contr {
(*Account id *)
acc : address;
(* Initial balance *)
init_bal : nat;
(* Initial state of the contract protocol *)
init_state : S;
(* Contract comes with a set of transitions *)
transitions : seq (transition S);
(* All transitions have unique tags *)
_ : uniq (map ttag transitions) }.
Figure 2. Basic definitions: states, transitions, and contracts.
parameters and local variables, bound via let keyword. Gallina is
intentionally non-Turing complete: it does not have an implicit
state or pointers; all loops are provably terminating and can be
expressed via well-founded recursive functions.
Before translating our first Scilla contract to Coq/Gallina, we
first present the structure of the contract encoding, defined in terms
of the automata model. Our embedding of Scilla to Coq is, thus,
shallow [30]: we model the semantics of the pure (i.e., non message-
passing) component of Scilla contracts via native Gallina functions,
while the message-passing, state-transition aspect of Scilla is ac-
counted for by encoding contract semantics as a relation in Coq. In
essence, this is similar to implementing a regular domain-specific
language with a tailored execution runtime on top of Lisp or Scala.
The top part of Figure 2 shows Coq definitions of the main
concepts constituting Scilla-like contracts. Three data types repre-
sented by Coq’s Structure definitions: message, cstate, and bstate
define structures for modelling contract messages, contract states
and blockchain state. In our model, messages carry four fields:
value, i.e., some amount of funds (isomorphic for now to a natural
number of type nat), and address of the message sender analo-
gous to Ethereum’s sender field, a tag indicating a transition of
a callee contract to be invoked, and a body message modelling
application-specific payload, containing all remaining fields of the
message. Generic contract state data type cstate, parameterised
by an application-specific state data type S, additionally contains
two mandatory fields, my_id and balance, storing the contract’s
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(immutable) address and a current balance, which might change
during the contract’s lifetime. All additional fields are encapsulated
in the state component, which is to be defined by the contract
implementor. Finally, the bstate data type is used to model the
blockchain component that a contract can read from. For simplicity,
the figure omits all components but the current latest block number,
which is represented by a natural number. Indeed, in the future
we are planning to enrich this state for reasoning about contracts
that reflect on the blockchain state, e.g., read from the results of
previous transactions or even the state of other contracts.
The data type transition describes contract transitions: its ttag
component serves to uniquely identify a transition and implement
the message-based dispatch (using method field of an incoming
message), while tfun implements the transition function, which
takes as arguments the contract’s own address, its current balance
of type value, state, as well as an incoming message and a current
blockchain snapshots, and returns a new state and an optional
message. No returned message corresponds to an execution step
resulting in an exception.
The contract data type Contract serves to package together con-
tract’s transitions, its address, balance, and initial state, and can
be thought of as a template for contract definitions in Solidity-like
languages. Most of the fields of the Contract record (parameterised
with the application-specific contract state type S) are, thus, self-
explanatory. We represent the fixed collection of transitions of a
contract automata by a sequence of values of type transition, i.e.,
tagged transfer functions. The only unusual component of a con-
tract definition is its last property field. It intentionally has no name,
which is indicated by the placeholder _. What is important, however,
is its type, which asserts a statement. Specifically, it requires that
all transitions tags are unique. Intuitively, this is a basic contract
validity property, which our encoding enforces at the level of the
framework, rather than individual contract. Unlike Solidity and
other object-oriented languages, such as Java and C#, taking Coq as
a host for domain-specific embedding makes it possible to statically
encode and enforce data structure invariants. In other words, it
will be impossible to construct a contract in our embedding, such
that it has two or more transitions with the same tag. By design,
for now this is the only property imposed for any Scilla contract
and verified by a compiler during the embedding into Coq. Any
other correctness guarantee is contract specific, and will have to
be proven for a particular instance of the Contract data type, i.e.,
for a particular user-defined contract.
3.2 Semantics, safety, and consistency properties
Having defined the basic terminology of contract embedding into
Coq, we can now define the meaning of a contract’s behaviour in
the form of execution traces. Figure 3 first describes a data type step,
which captures a triple, corresponding to single step of a contract
taking a particular transition and modifying its state accordingly:
a contract pre-state pre, post-state pos and an optional output out.
A trace of a contract is defined as a sequence of steps. The auxil-
iary data type schedule, represented by a sequence of blockchain
states and messages, allows us to model all possible interactions
between the contract and its environment (i.e., other contracts and
the constantly changing blockchain).
To see how all contract traces can be modelled by considering all
possible schedules, let us first take a look at the semantic function
step_prot that takes a contract state pre, a blockchain state bc and
(* A single-step execution: pre/post states and output;
contract-specific state S is now assumed to be fixed. *)
Structure step :=
Step { pre : cstate S;
post : cstate S;
out : option message }.
Definition trace := seq step.
Definition schedule := seq (bstate * message).
(* In the following definition, a contract automata C
is implicit and fixed. *)
Definition step_prot (pre : cstate S) (bc : bstate)
(m : message) : step :=
let CState id bal s := pre in
let (s', out) := apply_transition C id bal s m bc in
let bal' := if out is Some m'
then (bal + val m) - val m' else bal in
let post := CState id bal' s' in
Step pre post out.
(* Map a schedule into a trace *)
Fixpoint execute (pre : cstate S) (sc: schedule) : trace :=
if sc is (bc, m) :: sc'
then let stp := step_prot pre bc m in
stp :: execute (post stp) sc'
else [::].
Definition state0 :=
CState (acc C) (init_bal C) (init_state C).
Definition execute0 sc :=
if sc is _ :: _ then execute state0 sc
else [:: Step state0 state0 None].
Figure 3. Contract traces and semantics.
an incoming message m, resulting in a step instance. The way it
is defined, it simply finds an appropriate transition in a contract
definition C and applies it using the function apply_transition,
whose definition we have omitted for brevity. In the case if no
transition matching m’s tag is found, the contract’s state and balance
are left unchanged; otherwise the new state s' and an output are
obtained and, together with an updated contract balance bal' are
used to construct the final state post.
That is, for a fixed contract C, every component of the schedule
(i.e., a pair blockchain state, message) determines its next step, and,
hence, the changes in its state and balance. Therefore, given an ini-
tial state pre and a schedule sc, we can define a contract execution
as a trace, obtained by consecutively processing all components
of the schedule by the contract—precisely what is defined by a re-
cursive semantic function execute. Finally, given an initial contract
state, balance, and account, the valid execution of a schedule sc is
defined via the semantic meta-function execute0, which executes
the entire given schedule sc or simply performs an identity step
from the initial state in the case if sc is empty.
A trace-based semantics of contracts, provided by means of the
definitions of execute and execute0 makes it possible to formulate
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generic classes of contract correctness conditions, independently
of the specifics of the end-used contracts or properties of interest.
Safety. We first define a predicate I on a contract state (denoted,
in Coq terms, by a “function type” cstate S →Prop from the type
of states cstate S to propositions Prop) to be a safety property if it
holds at any state of a contract, that can be obtained as a result of
interaction between the contract and its environment, starting from
the initial state. The following Coq definition states this formally:
Definition safe (I : cstate S → Prop) : Prop :=
(* For any schedule sc, pre/post states and out... *)
∀ sc pre post out,
(* such that the triple Step (pre, post, out)
is in the trace obtained via sc *)
Step pre post out ∈ execute0 sc →
(* both pre and post satisfy I *)
I pre ∧ I post.
A safety propertymeans some universally true correctness condi-
tion holds at any contract’s state, which is reachable from its initial
configuration via any schedule sc. Typical examples of safety prop-
erties of interest include: “a contract’s balance is always positive”,
“a contract’s balance equals the sum of balances of its contribu-
tors”, or “at any moment no money is blocked on the contract”.
The definition above thus defines safety by universally quantifying
over all schedules sc, as well as step-triples Step pre post out that
occur in a trace, obtained by following sc. While this definition is
descriptive, it is not very pleasant to work with. This is why we
define a natural proof principle to establish safety of a property I.
The proof principle is stated as the following Coq’s Lemma:5
Lemma safe_ind (I : cstate S → Prop) :
(* (a) *)
I state0 →
(* (b) *)
(∀ pre bc m, (method m ∈ tags p) → I pre →
I (post (step_prot pre bc m))) →
(* (conclusion) *)
safe I.
That is, in order to show that the property I is indeed a safety one,
one has to show that (a) it holds in the initial contract’s state state0,
and (b) if it holds in a pre-state pre (i.e., I pre), and a contract makes
a transition in a blockchain state bc via a message m, then I holds
over the post-state: I (post (step_prot pre bc m)).
The proof of this lemma, justifying the validity of this induction
principle, is in our Coq sources and is omitted from this document
for the sake of brevity. One can notice that the lemma safe_ind is
strikingly similar to the classical notion of mathematical induction
for natural numbers, and it is indeed, an induction on a number,
namely, the length of a schedule and, correspondingly a contract
execution trace. This is not the only possible induction principle
one can adopt for proving safety of a contract with respect to a
given property. For instance, certain other properties are easier
to be proven by induction on the size of a certain contract field,
considering a trace arbitrary, but fixed. Fortunately, almost any valid
proof principle for safety can be encoded in Coq as a lemma, similar
to the one above. Our plans involve developing a library of multiple
proof principles for proving diverse contract properties, formulated
5One can think of lemmas as of “library functions”, whose statement (type) is of
importance but the proof (implementation) is opaque and can be ignored by the users.
as Coq lemmas, along with the comprehensive documentation on
their usage and applicability, so the contract developer could pick
one depending on her goal and on the nature of the property or a
contract.
Temporal properties. Sometimes a property of interest cannot
be expressed in terms of a predicate over a single state, as it de-
scribes entire sub-traces of a contract execution. Such properties are
traditionally expressed using connectives of Temporal Logic [45],
that relate two or more states in a trace, generated by executing a
state-transition system, such as Scilla contract.
Reasoning principles and the corresponding connectives cus-
tomary for temporal logic can be encoded in Coq by means of
defining logical higher-order operators on traces, in the spirit of
higher-order functions in programming languages such as OCaml
or Haskell. We are still in the process of determining a minimal
set of such connectives, necessary to declaratively describe the
contract behaviour. As an example, let us consider a temporal con-
nective since_as_long p q r, which means the following: once the
contract is in a state st, in which (i) the property p is satisfied, each
state st' reachable from st (ii) satisfies a binary property q st st'
(with respect to st), as long as (iii) every element of the schedule
sc, “leading” from st to st' satisfies a predicate r.
The corresponding Coq encoding of the since_as_long connec-
tive is given below. We first specify reachability between states st
and st' via a schedule sc as the state st' being the last post-state
in a trace obtained by executing the contract from st via sc:
Definition reachable (st st' : cstate S) sc :=
st' = post (last (Step st st None) (execute st sc)).
We next employ the definition of reachability to define the since
connective, which is parameterised by predicates p, q and r. The
premises (i)–(iii) are outlined in the corresponding comments in
the following Coq code:
(* q holds since p, as long as schedule bits satisfy r. *)
Definition since_as_long (p : cstate S → Prop)
(q : cstate S → cstate S → Prop)
(r : bstate * message → Prop) :=
∀ sc st st',
(* (i) st satisfies p *)
p st →
(* (ii) st' is reachable from st via sc *)
reachable st st' sc →
(* (iii) any element b of sc satisfies r *)
(∀ b, b ∈ sc → r b) →
(* (conclusion) q holds over st and st' *)
q st st'.
Why this logical connective is useful for reasoning about contract
correctness? As we will show further, it makes it possible to con-
cisely express “preservation” properties relating contract balance
and state, so that they hold as long as certain actions do not get
triggered by some of the contract’s users.
3.3 Embedding Scilla into Coq
Figure 4 shows the translation of the Scilla implementation of
the Crowdfunding contract from Figure 1 to Coq. The translation
is mostly straightforward, and for now has been done by hand,
but in the future we intend to automate it. We only outline a few
discrepancies between the Scilla code and its Coq counterpart,
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1 (* Contract-specific state S *)
2 Structure crowdState := CS {
3 owner : address;
4 max_block : nat;
5 goal : value;
6 backers : seq (address * value);
7 funded : bool }.
8
9 (* Initial parameters *)
10 Parameter init_owner : address.
11 Parameter init_block : nat.
12 Parameter init_goal : value.
13
14 (* Initial state *)
15 Definition init_state :=
16 CS (init_owner, init_block, init_max_goal) [::] false.
17
18 (* Transition: tag and a transfer function. *)
19 Definition donate_tag := 1.
20
21 Definition donate_fun := fun id bal s m bc ⇒
22 if method m == donate_tag then
23 let bs := backers s in
24 let nxt_block := block_num bc + 1 in
25 let from := sender m in
26 if get_max_block s <= nxt_block
27 then (s, Some (Msg 0 id from 0 no_msg))
28 else if all [pred e | e.1 != from] bs
29 (* new backer *)
30 then let bs' := (from, val m) :: bs in
31 let s' := set_backers s bs' in
32 (s', Some (Msg 0 id from 0 ok_msg))
33 else (s, Some (Msg 0 id from 0 no_msg))
34 else (s, None).
35
36 Definition donate := CTrans donate_tag donate_fun.
37 Definition getfunds_tag := 2.
38 Definition getfunds_fun : tft := fun id bal s m bc ⇒
39 let from := sender m in
40 if (method m == getfunds_tag) && (from == get_owner s) then
41 let blk := block_num bc + 1 in
42 if get_max_block s < blk
43 then if get_goal s <= bal
44 then let s' := set_funded s true in
45 (s', Some (Msg bal id from 0 ok_msg))
46 else (s, Some (Msg 0 id from 0 no_msg))
47 else (s, Some (Msg 0 id from 0 no_msg))
48 else (s, None).
49 Definition get_funds := CTrans getfunds_tag getfunds_fun.
50
51 Definition claim_tag := 3.
52 Definition claim_fun := fun id bal s m bc ⇒
53 let from := sender m in
54 if method m == claim_tag then
55 let blk := block_num bc in
56 if blk <= get_max_block s
57 then (* Too early to ask for reimbursements! *)
58 (s, Some (Msg 0 id from 0 no_msg))
59 else let bs := backers s in
60 if (funded s) || (get_goal s <= bal)
61 (* Cannot reimburse: campaign succeeded *)
62 then (s, Some (Msg 0 id from 0 no_msg))
63 else let n := seq.find [pred e | e.1 == from] bs in
64 if n < size bs
65 then let v := nth 0 (map snd bs) n in
66 let bs' := filter [pred e | e.1 != from] bs in
67 let s' := set_backers s bs' in
68 (s', Some (Msg v id from 0 ok_msg))
69 else (* Didn't back or have already claimed *)
70 (s, None)
71 else (s, None).
72 Definition claim := CTrans claim_tag claim_fun.
Figure 4. Crowdfunding contract translated into Coq: contract-specific state, initial parameters, and transitions.
which were introduced to streamline the reasoning and make full
use of Coq’s programming component Gallina.
The state of the contract is defined using Coq’s Structure declara-
tion, familiar from the previous sections. Unlike the code in Figure 1,
the definition does not distinguish between immutable contract
parameters and mutable fields. However, while we provide getters
for all five components of the state (e.g., get_owner, get_backers,
etc), we provide setters only for the two last fields, i.e., set_backers
and set_funded, which are considered mutable. For now, we model
mappings by associative sequences, hence the “field”, backers is
encoded as a sequence of pairs (address, value), indicating the
backers and the corresponding amount they have donated.
The contract’s owner, maximal block determining the end of
the campaign, and the funding goal are expressed via Gallina’s
Parameters and can be instantiated later, once a specific contract in-
stance is created. Having those three parameters abstract, we define
the constructor init_state for the initial state that also instantiates
backers with an empty sequence [::], and sets the boolean funded
flag to false.
The remaining Coq code defines the encoding of the three tran-
sitions of the contract, by means of specifying their tags (e.g.,
donate_tag), transfer functions (e.g., donate_fun), and packaging
them together in a single transition (e.g., donate). In this version
of the encoding, we model implicit mutable state of the contract
by explicit functional state-passing style. That is, each transition’s
transfer function takes the current contract’s state s, as well as
the incoming message m and a blockchain state bc as its param-
eters. The mapping between Scilla primitive commands is then
as follows. Reading from a contract’s state x ←& f; is translated
into let x := get_f s in .... Writing into a contract field f := e
is translated into let s' := set_f s e in ..., where s' is the new,
modified state to passed further in the computation. Finally, reading
from the blockchain x ←&& g; is encoded via let x := get_g bc.
A specific shape of a blockchain getter depends on the property
being read. For instance, the current block number can be obtained
via block_num bc, as shown on line 24 of Figure 4. Following the
shallow embedding style, in our translation, we have also formu-
lated Scilla’s transition filters via Gallina’s native if-then-else
construct.
Other difference between Scilla representation and Coq trans-
lation involves representing mappings: instead of using language-
provided primitives put/get/contains, we implement them using
Coq’s functions for sequence manipulation. For instance, the call
to contains(bs, sender) from Figure 1’s line 25 is implemented in
Gallina translation via all [pred e | e.1 != from] bs in line 28
of Figure 4, checking that no single entry e has from as its first
component, that is, making sure that the sequence does not yet
contain a record of sender m. In a similar spirit, put is encoded via
appending a head to a sequence (line 30 of Figure 4), and removing
an entry is done via filter function (line 66 of Figure 4). Relying
on Coq’s support for sequence for encoding mappings makes it
possible to reuse a rich library of lemmas about them, thus, sparing
us the expense of having to implement a new library for mappings.6
6Although we might consider implementing such a library in the future to streamline
the translation.
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For simplicity, at the moment our encoding does not account for
explicit reentrancy, i.e., it does not involve continuations, and every
execution branch of every transitions terminates by providing a
new state (which can be equal to the previous state), as well as
an optional output message, to be sent to its destination (third
argument of the Msg constructor). The transitions resulting in None
as an output should be interpreted as resulting in an exception,
which is customary in the functional programming tradition [53].
In this case, the state of the contract is left unchanged.
3.4 Reasoning about contract behaviour
A definition of a contract as a state-transition system and mod-
elling all its execution traces makes it possible to verify its complex
properties in isolation, i.e., modularly and independently of other
contracts and users that might interact with it. This is achieved by
defining safety and temporal properties as universally quantified
over schedules, which serve as an external oracle [34] and thus ac-
count for all non-determinism of distributed on-chain interaction.
Proving a property for all schedules means proving it for any po-
tential adversary, as all its interaction with the contract are limited
by what the contract allows for, in terms of its transitions.
We now show how the combination of notions of safety and
temporal properties presented above allows us to verify a contract,
proving that all its behaviours satisfy a certain complex interaction
scenario. Specifically, for our Crowdfunding example, let us prove
that, once a donation d has been made by a backer with an account
address b, given that the campaign eventually fails, the backer b
will be always able to get their donation d back. There are indeed
multiple ways to express this property formally in terms of contract
behaviours. For simplicity, we break the statement of interest into
three independent components, which, in conjunction provide the
requirement stated above.
Property 1: The contract does not leak funds unless the cam-
paign has been funded. First, let us state and prove that the
contract does not spend the money given to it by the backers, un-
less the campaign has been funded. To do so, we will make use of
Coq’s native functions map, used to apply a function to all elements
of a sequence, and sumn for summing up contents of a sequence.
The property of interest, dubbed balance_backed, is as follows:
Definition balance_backed st : Prop :=
(* If the campaign has not been funded... *)
¬ funded (state st) →
(* the contract has enough funds to reimburse all. *)
sumn (map snd (backers (state st))) <= balance st.
For an arbitrary contract state st, it asserts that if the funded flag is
still false in st (i.e., ¬funded (state st)), then the balance of the
contract (balance st) is at least as large as the sum of all donations
made by the recorded backers (sumn (map snd (backers (state st)))).
Does this property hold for every state of an arbitrary instance
of the Crowdfunding contract? To show this, we state the following
theorem,7 claiming that balance_backed is a safety property:
Theorem sufficient_funds_safe : safe balance_backed.
The statement of the theorem relies on the definition of safe, instan-
tiating it (implicitly) for an instance of the Crowdfunding contract,
7Theorem declarations in Coq are no different from Lemmas, but are usually consid-
ered more important.
as well as (explicitly) for the property balance_backed. A machine-
checked proof of the theorem, which takes less than 50 lines of
Coq code, is conducted by using the induction principle safe_ind
defined above. For instance, the property balance_backed clearly
holds in the initial state of the contract, as the set of backers is
empty ([::]), and the balance cannot be negative. Thus, we can
formally prove that a non-funded campaign does not lose/spend
money of its backers.
Property 2: The contract preserves records of individual dona-
tions. So far, we have proved that the non-funded Crowdfunding
contract does not lose money, but what about individual backers?
What if the contract takes the donations and silently transfers them
from one backer to another, or, even worse, removes the backer
from its records, “pretending”, that no donation has ever been made.
To assert that this is not the case, we rely on the temporal connec-
tive since_as_long defined above and state that, once a backer made
a donation, the record of it is not going to be lost by the contract,
as long as the backer makes no attempt to withdraw its donation.
We first define two auxiliary predicates, specific to our contract
and the shape of its state:
(* Contribution d of a backer b is recorded
in the field 'backers'. *)
Definition donated b (d : value) st :=
get (backers (state st)), b) == [:: (b, d)].
(* b doesn't claim its funding back *)
Definition no_claims_from b (q : bstate * message) :=
sender q.2 != b.
The predicate donated specifies that the backer-recording field of
the contract has the corresponding entry (b, d). The predicate
no_claims_from is defined on schedule bits and ensures that a given
schedule component q does not contain a message from the ad-
dress b. Together, we use these two predicates to state the desired
temporal property of the contract:
Theorem donation_preserved (b : address) (d : value):
since_as_long c (donated b d)
(fun _ s' ⇒ donated b d s')
(no_claims_from b).
The mechanised proof of this fact is by induction on the trace
connecting the initial state s, in which a donation record is observed,
and any fixed subsequent state s' which is reachable from s via
schedules, satisfying the predicate no_claims_from. The existence
of such a proof indeed validates the claim that the contract does
not mess up with records during its execution, unless the backer
tries to claim their donations back.
Property 3: If the campaign fails, the backers can get their
refund. By now we know that the contract does not lose the
donated funds and keeps the backer records intact. Now we need
the last piece: the proof that if a contract is not funded, and the
campaign has failed (deadline has passed and the goal has not been
reached), then any backer with the corresponding record can get
the donation back.
We state the property of interest as theorem can_claim_back in
Figure 5. As its premises (a)–(d), the theorem lists all the assump-
tions about the state of the contract that are necessary for getting
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Theorem can_claim_back id b d st bc:
(* (a) The backer b has donated d, so the contract holds
that record in its state *)
donated b d st →
(* (b) The campaign has not been funded. *)
¬ funded (state st) →
(* (c) Balance is small: not reached the goal. *)
balance st < (get_goal (state st)) →
(* (d) Block number exceeds the deadline. *)
get_max_block (state st) < block_num bc →
(* (conclusion) Backer b can get their donation back. *)
∃ (m : message),
sender m == b ∧
out (step_prot c st bc m) = Some (Msg d id b 0 ok_msg).
Figure 5. A backer can claim back her funds if the campaign fails.
the reimbursement. The conclusion is somewhat peculiar: it ex-
presses the possibility to claim back the funds by postulating the
existence of a message m, such that it can be sent by a backer b,
and the response will be a message with precisely d funds in it,
sent back to b. The theorem, whose proof is only 10 lines of Coq,
formulates the property as one single-step, yet its statement can
be easily shown to be a safety property, as it is, indeed, preserved
by the transitions, and, after the funds are successfully claimed for
the first time, the premise (a) of the statement is going to be false,
hence the property will trivially hold.
Putting it all together. Together, Properties 1–3 deliver the de-
sired correctness condition of a contract: once donated money can
be claimed back in the case of a failed campaign. It is indeed not
the only notion of correctness that intuitively should hold over
this particular contract, and by proving it we did not ensure that
the contract is “bug-free”. For instance, in our study we focused
on backers only, while another legit concern would be to formally
verify that the contract’s owner will be able transfer the cumulative
donation to their account in the case if the campaign is successful.
In a similar vein, another desired property would be to ensure
that no funds will be locked on the contract forever as recently
happened with the Parity multi-signature wallet [17]: in a finite
amount of time either all backers or the owner will be able to
relieve the contract of its funds. The latter correctness condition is
of particular interest, as it falls into the class of liveness properties,
stating that “something good eventually happen”. While we do not
show its proof here, our formalisation of contract executions makes
it possible to prove liveness properties.
4 Discussion
Representing smart contracts as communicating automata enables
multiple opportunities for logic-based verification. It also opens new
challenges with respect to the design of better high-level contract
languages and their expressivity.
4.1 Towards logic-based reasoning about contracts
As we have demonstrated, together, the combination of universal
safety properties and multiple temporal properties (including live-
ness, which we briefly sketch later in this section) constitute various
contract correctness criteria. Indeed, the notion of correctness is in
the eyes of the beholder : each contract comes with a unique set of
correctness conditions, and there is no single property that captures
all possible notions of “a contract not going wrong”. Even more so, a
behaviour considered erroneous in one contract (e.g., reentrancy in
Ethereum-style contracts) might be a feature exercised consciously
and without harm in another implementation. Defining precisely
the desired contract properties is an art of formal specification and
is outside the scope of this technical presentation. We believe that
having a clean contract semantics and an expressive logical abstrac-
tions is of crucial importance for formally describing the behaviour
of blockchain-based applications.
Therefore, we consider our mission to provide semantic founda-
tions, as well as a logical vocabulary for making it possible to for-
mulate and prove all reasonable contract properties, giving Scilla
programmers a toolset to implement, specify, and mechanically ver-
ify the contracts with respect to correctness conditions of interest.
We also believe that prototyping a contract language by encoding
its programs and their semantics in a state-of-the art language with
dependent types and a support for formal machine-assisted proofs,
such as Coq, Agda [21], F⋆ [52], or Idris [22] provides a principled
way to rigorously specify and verify the implementation for a large
class of notions of correctness in terms of the programs themselves,
rather than their models [50].
4.2 On Turing-completeness and contract language design
Our host framework Coq’s programming language Gallina, which
was used to implement a verifiable version of Scilla by means of
shallow embedding, is not Turing-complete: each well-typed Coq
function, when applied to concrete arguments, will terminate in
a finite number of steps. By defining Scilla and its embedding to
Coq in a way that its pure and state-manipulating in-transition
computations are modelled by Coq’s pure total functions, we en-
sured that all Scilla transitions terminate. This made it possible
to conduct verification by means of symbolic execution of Coq’s
expressions with explicit state. Keeping the programming compo-
nent of transfer functions strictly terminating, in the future, we
should be able to provide better support for automating the proofs
of safety/temporal properties by employing third-party tools, such
as TLA+ [36] and Ivy [43]. In our proof-of-concept contract ver-
ification effort, we have not explicitly accounted for analysis of
resources or computational effects, such as exceptions. Such effects
can be modelled in a similar way, i.e., by explicit encoding of an
effect-passing and cost-counting discipline, or by engineering a
version of an indexed monad to keep track of the effect in the type
system [16, 41].
While transitions of Scilla contracts are strictly terminating by
construction, they still might take arbitrarily long to compute, e.g.,
in the presence of a large data value passed by a message. Even
more, one is still able to implement potentially non-terminating (in
the absence of limited stack length or gas bounds) computations by
making a contract calling itself, directly or indirectly, via a message-
passing mechanism or explicit continuations. This is similar to
implementing recursion via so-called “Landin’s knot”, i.e., not by
means of the language function calling mechanisms, but through
the (blockchain) state, storing a computation (i.e., a contract). To
be able to statically detect such scenarios before a transaction is
fired, we are going to implement an analysis to deliver precise
parameterised cost boundaries on transition executions.
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5 Related Proposals
Every blockchain either has a (limited) scripting language for trans-
action validation as in say Bitcoin or a general purpose smart con-
tract language as in Ethereum. In the recent years, several new
languages improving upon languages in Bitcoin and Ethereum
have been proposed by the community. Each language is usually
designed in the context of a specific underlying blockchain. Be-
low, we compare Scilla and some of the existing smart contract
languages and the improvement proposals.
• Typecoin (Bitcoin) [26]: Typecoin is a logical commitment
mechanism built on top of Bitcoin to carry logical propositions.
The underlying idea in Typecoin is to have a transaction carry
logical propositions instead of coins. In fact, each Bitcoin trans-
action can be translated into a Typecoin transaction where the
inputs and outputs become propositions and the logic would
allow to split or merge inputs. This allows transactions to be
type-checked before they get committed to the blockchain. Since,
UTXOs can only be merged or split, the underlying logic is linear
in nature and is not rich to handle complex states as in Scilla.
• Simplicity (Bitcoin) [42]: Simplicity is themost recent language
proposed in the context of Bitcoin. Since Bitcoin uses a UTXO
model and the state of the system is not as complex as in say
Ethereum, the language design does not need to handle read and
write to a global state. As a result, the language follows Bitcoin’s
design of self-contained transactions whereby contracts do not
have access to any information outside the transaction. This
further implies that Simplicity does not support communicating
contracts. Scilla on the other hand manages read and write to
a shared memory space and is designed for an account-based
model, where contracts can communicate with each other.
• Solidity (Ethereum) [14]: Solidity is the most popular smart
contract language today. It is a Turing complete language and
resembles JavaScript. However, the expressivity of the language
has introduced avenues for several vulnerabilities in the past. For
instance, a class of re-entrancy attacks was shown to be possible
due to arbitrary interleaving of local state manipulations and
external calls [29]. Scilla restricts the computation model to
communicating automata and mandates external calls to occur
at the end of the transition. Also, CPS style explicit passing of
return values to the caller makes reasoning about programs much
easier. With Scilla, we further show how to prove critical safety
and liveness properties on the contract. As for Solidity, the Tur-
ing completeness nature of the language makes contracts less
amenable to formal verification.
• Bamboo (Ethereum) [2]: Among all language proposals, Bam-
boo is the closest to Scilla. Bamboo relies on polymorphic con-
tracts where one contract changes to another whenever a state
change occurs. While, in Scilla the transition function changes
the state while the transition itself does not change. In fact, Bam-
boo’s morphing of contracts can be easily encoded via a state
component in Scilla. The other difference being that Bamboo
does not focus on the verification aspect of the contracts.
• Babbage (Ethereum) [1]: Babbage is a conceptual-level design
of a smart contract proposed in the context of Ethereum. The
design adopts amechanical model of writing contracts as opposed
to a textual program. But, due to its underlying simplicity and
lack of formal design semantics, it is hard to compare it with
Scilla and assess its amenability to formal reasoning.
• F⋆ embedding (Ethereum): Bhargavan et al. [20] provide a
framework to analyze and verify both the runtime safety and the
functional correctness of Ethereum contracts written in Solidity
by translation to F⋆, a function programming language aimed at
program verification. The work however does not present a new
programming model as in Scilla.
• Viper (Ethereum) [15]: Viper is an experimental language pro-
posed in the context of Ethereum to ease the auditability of smart
contracts. The language does not have recursive calling and in-
finite loops. As a result, one can eliminate the need to set an
upper bound on gas limits that is known to be vulnerable to
gas limit attacks. Viper also plans to remove the possibility of
making changes to the state after any non-static calls. The idea
being that this will prevent reentrancy attacks. Scilla takes a
slightly stricter approach where any external call has to be the
last instruction of a transition function.
• Rholang (RChain) [11]: While Scilla is based on communi-
cating automata, Rholang is based on asynchronous polyadic
π -calculus that is best suited to work in a concurrent setting.
Rholang admits unbounded recursion, while Scilla will only
allow bounded recursion. The other difference comes from the
fact that Scilla mandates all external calls to be tail calls. As a
result, there is no complex interleaving of external calls and local
instructions. Hence, analyzing and proving safety properties in
Scilla becomes much easier than in Rholang.
• Michelson (Tezos) [7]: Michelson is a purely functional stack-
based language that has no side-effects. On the other hand, Scilla
is not purely functional as transitions do affect the external state.
• Liquidity (Tezos) [5]: Liquidity is a high-level language that
complies with the security restrictions of Michelson. Because
of its compatibility with Michelson, a similar comparison with
Scilla holds.
• Plutus (IOHK) [10]: Plutus is a language based on typed λ-
calculus designed to run transaction validation for a blockchain
like Bitcoin. As a result, the language is simpler that Scilla,
which allows contracts to manipulate global state and make ex-
ternal calls to other contracts. Also, because of the automata
based design, Scilla contracts are easily composable.
• OWL (BOSCoin) [23]: OWL for Web Ontology Language is
being developed in the context of BOSCoin. The underlying com-
putation model in OWL is Timed Automata [18], and hence
bears some similarity with Scilla. However, OWL advocates for
pure functions without side effects, while Scilla is not purely
functional and hence allows complex yet cleanly separated inter-
actions with other contracts.
• F⋆ dialect (Zen) [39]: Zen uses a dialect of F⋆ for its smart con-
tract language. The smart contracts in Zen are stateless and are
functionally pure. This means that there are no side effects and
no interaction with other contracts. While, this removes race
conditions and any barriers to parallel execution it also severely
limits the kind of smart contracts that one can build. For instance,
multiple transactions involving the same smart contract may not
be easily parallelised, and may have to be executed in series. In
Scilla, we understand the need of impure functions and we also
understand the complexities arising from it. As a result, Scilla’s
computation model cleanly separates local computations and
external calls that require communication. With a clean separa-
tion, it becomes possible to eliminate complex and undesirable
interleaving of local computations and external calls.
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6 Conclusion & Future Work
In this work, we outlined the design of Scilla—an intermediate level
language for smart contracts. Scilla provides a clear separation
between the communication aspect of a smart contract and its
programming component. The underlying computation model in
Scilla is based on communicating automata. We also presented
an embedding of a Scilla contract to Coq and proved safety and
liveness properties of the contract. Future work consists in defining
a formal grammar and semantics of the language and implementing
Scilla, as well as a developing and verifying a number of contracts
in it, on a real-world blockchain platform.
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